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Memory is considered to be a flexible and reconstructive system. However, there is 
little experimental evidence demonstrating how associations are falsely constructed in 
memory and even less is known about the role of the self in memory construction. We 
investigated whether false associations involving non-presented stimuli can be 
constructed in episodic memory and if the self plays a role in such memory 
construction.  In two experiments, we paired participants’ own names (i.e., self-
reference) or the name “Adele” (i.e., other-reference) with words and pictures from 
Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists. We found that (1) participants not only 
falsely remembered the non-presented lure words and pictures as having been 
presented, but also misremembered that they were paired with their own name or 
“Adele”, depending on the referenced person of related DRM lists; and (2) there were 
more critical lure-self associations constructed in the self-reference condition than 
critical lure-other associations in the other-reference condition for word but not for 
picture stimuli. These results suggest a self-enhanced constructive effect that might be 
driven by both relational and item-specific processing. Our results support the 
spreading activation account for constructive episodic memory.  
 





Self-referential False Associations:  
A Self-enhanced Constructive Effect for Verbal but Not Pictorial Stimuli 
Episodic memory enables individuals to bind different elements of an 
experience into a coherent and meaningful mental representation (Eichenbaum & 
Cohen, 2004; Tulving, 2002). However, during such memory encoding processes, and 
subsequently during retrieval, errors or distortions may occur, reflecting the 
constructive nature of memory (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Cheng, Werning, & 
Suddendorf, 2016). For example, the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis 
proposes that our memory system may flexibly recombine elements from different 
episodes to simulate future situations (Schacter & Addis, 2007). Although there is 
evidence showing this constructive combination in episodic memory (e.g., 
misattribution of true memory to a wrong source; Carpenter & Schacter, 2017), only 
limited knowledge exists on how false memories can be flexibly combined with 
episodes from past experiences. The general purpose of the current paper was to 
examine whether the memory system can falsely combine different elements from 
memory episodes and thus create false associations in episodic memory. 
The self plays a critical role in episodic memory (Conway, 2005; Tulving, 
2002). Indeed, the role of self in memory has extensively been investigated since the 
1970s (e.g., Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997). The self has 
been found to facilitate perceptual processing of stimuli. For example, the self-
reference recollection effect (SRRE, Conway & Dewhurst, 1995) refers to the 
phenomenon that people have more recollective experiences (e.g., more details, 
higher vividness) when encoding information with reference to oneself compared to 
encoding information with reference to others. Recently, studies have shown that the 
self can act as a binding mechanism that serves to aid in the combination of memories 
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with sources (Sui & Humphry, 2015). For example, Cunningham, Brebner, Quinn, 
and Turk (2014) found that after seeing objects (e.g., an apple or a cup) paired with 
either their own face or other people’s faces, children remembered the stimuli-self 
associations better than the stimuli-other associations. Leshikar and Duarte (2014) 
found similar results in young and older adults showing that object-scene bindings 
(e.g., saxophone–beach) were remembered better in a self-referenced manner than in 
an other-referenced manner. Thus, it has been shown that the self can facilitate 
(correct) binding between items as well as binding between the self and items in 
episodic memory (see also Durbin, Mitchell, & Johnson, 2017). As mentioned, 
because memory is constructive, the very process of encoding and storing information 
in memory can lead to distortions including source memory errors (e.g., Carpenter & 
Schacter, 2017). However, rarely has the role of self been examined in such 
constructive memory processes. Therefore, another aim of the current study was to 
investigate the role of self in constructing (false) associations in episodic memory. 
To address this, we examined self-referential processing in a well-established 
false memory procedure, the Deese/Roediger–McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In the DRM paradigm participants encode 
word lists that contain related items such as butter, flour, dough, sandwich, jam, milk 
and so on, which are all related to a non-presented critical lure (i.e., bread). After 
studying the list of related items, participants usually falsely remember the critical 
lure (i.e., bread) as also having been presented. Recently, Wang, Otgaar, Howe, and 
Zhou (2019) examined the impact of self-reference on false memory (see also Rosa, 
Deason, Budson, & Gutchess, 2015; Rosa & Gutchess, 2013; Wang et al., 2021). 
They paired the DRM items with participants’ own names (i.e., to activate the self) 
and found that more false memories of the critical lures would be formed when the 
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DRM items were paired with one’s own name. One possible mechanism for the self-
enhanced false memory effect is that, when the self is paired with the DRM items, the 
self might enhance relational processing of the stimuli and thus strengthen the 
relatedness among the DRM items (Klein, 2012; Klein & Loftus, 1988), which in turn 
increases the activation of the critical lures (Wang et al., 2019). As critical lures are 
found to be activated at the encoding phase (e.g., Gallo, 2010), during which the self 
is presented/activated as well, we wondered whether people would also construct false 
associations between the critical lures and the self under self-referential processing.  
More specifically, our questions concerned whether, when DRM items are 
paired with the self (e.g., the participant’s own name) or with another person, would 
(1) false associations or binding between the referenced person and the critical lures 
be constructed and (2) the activation of the self, facilitate the false association 
construction between the self and the critical lure? Although recent research has 
shown that the self can enhance false memories of non-presented items (Rosa & 
Gutchess, 2013; Wang et al., 2019), no study has examined whether the self can 
impact false associations among items. False associations reflect incorrect binding 
between elements in episodic memory. Studying how false associations are formed 
can help uncover the (re)constructive mechanisms of episodic memory.  
According to spreading activation accounts of memory (e.g., Anderson, 1983; 
Associative-Activation Theory, AAT, Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; 
Otgaar, Howe, Muris, & Merckelbach, 2019; Activation-Monitoring Theory, AMT, 
Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001), memory is a network consisting of different 
concepts/elements and associations between related concepts. A key proposition made 
by spreading activation accounts is that the activation of one concept can spread to 
nearby concepts automatically along memory associations. As a consequence, after 
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people study items such as butter, flour, dough, sandwich, and jam, activations may 
spread to their related item bread, making people falsely remember it.  
When the self is encoded along with the DRM items (i.e., presenting one’s 
own name simultaneously with the DRM items), as Figure 1 shows, the concept of 
self, as well as the DRM items, would be activated in the memory network. Based on 
the spreading activation account, the critical lure that is related to the relevant DRM 
items may also become activated. Thus, the co-activation of the self and the critical 
lure may lead to a false recollection that the self has been presented together with the 
critical lure, resulting in a false association constructed between the self and the 
critical lure. Because the self can facilitate the binding of the self-stimuli associations 
(Cunningham et al., 2014; Sui & Humphreys, 2015), which can lead to higher levels 
of spreading activation, the self may facilitate the false association between the self 





Figure 1. Hypothetical associative memory network when the self is encoded together with DRM 
items, based on spreading activation theories (Howe et al., 2009; Roediger et al., 2001) and the 
mechanisms of self (e.g., Sui & Humphreys, 2015). Blue circles represent DRM list items; yellow 
dashed circle represents the non-presented critical lure. Red lines with an arrow refer to the pairing of 
self and stimuli during study. Black solid lines represent existed semantic associations among items in 
the memory network and dashed red line represents the proposed false association. 
 
Another mechanism underlying self-referencing is item-specific processing 
that involves the encoding of distinctive aspects of an item (Klein & Loftus, 1988; 
Klein, 2012; Symons & Johnson, 1997). That is, the self can promote the encoding of 
information specific to an individual item (e.g., color, shape, context) and thus 
promote recognition of that item by providing multiple retrieval routes. However, 
unlike the boosting effect of relational processing on false memory, item-specific 
processing or distinctive encoding has been found to reduce false memories (Huff & 
Bodner, 2019). For example, research showed that pictorial DRM lists, which contain 
more item-specific details, can suppress false memories of critical lures relative to 
their corresponding verbal DRM lists (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999; Wang, 
Otgaar, Howe, Felix, & Smeets, 2018).   
Research so far has found that false memory is boosted by self-referencing 
(Rosa & Gutchess, 2013; Wang et al., 2019). Researchers have argued that the self 
enhances false memory via relational processing because item-specific processing is 
mostly known to reduce false memory (e.g., Arndt & Reder, 2003; Huff & Bodner, 
2019; Schacter et al., 1999). However, it is still unknown whether item-specific 
processing still plays a role in the self-reference effect on false memory. Pictures of 
items (e.g., picture of a car) contain more item-specific details such as color and shape 
than words (e.g., the word car), hence pictorial DRM lists have higher levels of item-
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specific information or distinctiveness than verbal DRM lists (Schacter et al., 1999). 
By using both pictorial and verbal DRM lists, we can determine whether the level of 
item-specific information can mediate the self-reference effect on false memory. If 
item-specific processing is indeed an underlying mechanism of self-referencing, 
manipulating pictorial vs. verbal stimuli should impact self-referential false 
memories. If item-specific processing is not involved, there should be no statistical 
difference in self-referential false memory for verbal and pictorial stimuli.  
To our knowledge, no study has induced false associations related to non-
presented lures and no study has investigated the role of the self in generating false 
associations. The present experiments aimed to examine whether false associations 
with critical lures can be constructed in episodic memory and whether the self would 
facilitate such constructive processes in verbal and pictorial DRM lists.  Using both 
verbal and pictorial stimuli, we could examine the mechanisms underlying self-
referential false memory.  
 
The Current Experiments 
In two experiments, we presented participants with DRM lists together with 
either their own name (self-referenced condition) or another person’s names (e.g., the 
famous singer Adele; other-referenced condition). Experiments 1 and 2 followed 
similar procedures. During the study phase, participants were asked to remember 
DRM items shown to them as well as whom (self or other) the items appeared 
together with. In line with our previous study (Wang et al., 2019), after the study 
phase, participants were asked to recognize the items with Remember/Know 
judgements (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Yonelinas, 2002). Importantly, after the 
recognition test, participants were asked to remember whether the items had appeared 
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together with their own or another person’s name. Based on spreading-activation 
theories (Anderson, 1983; Howe et al., 2009; Roediger et al., 2001), we predicted that 
false associations between the referenced person and critical lures would be 
constructed in participants’ memory. Based on the relational processing mechanism of 
the self (Cunningham et al., 2014; Sui & Humphreys, 2015), we predicted that the 
self-referenced condition would result in more false associations than the other-
referenced condition. We also predicted that self-referencing would lead to higher 
accuracy rates for self-DRM item associations than other-referencing based on 






The experiment was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/zv342). As pre-registered, we calculated the required sample size using 
G. Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) prior to participant 
recruitment. We estimated a medium effect size (d = 0.5) based on related previous 
research (Wang et al., 2019). Power analysis showed that 34 participants were needed 
to reach a power of 0.8. Thirty-four participants from Maastricht University, the 
Netherlands were tested. The sample consisted of 14 males and 20 females (Mage= 
22.14, SD= 2.79, min 19 – max 29 years old). All participants were fluent in English. 
The experiment was approved by the ethical board of Faculty of Psychology and 





Eight DRM word lists and eight DRM picture lists with 8 items per list were 
used. The lists were taken from a previous study (Howe, Garner, & Patel, 2013). The 
picture lists were pictorial versions of DRM word lists that were normed for image 
and name agreement (i.e., to what extent the picture represents the DRM concept – 
see Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980; Wang et al., 2018). The picture lists have a mean 
image agreement rating of 4.22 (SD = 0.48) on a scale of 1 to 5 (see Wang et al., 
2018). Word lists and picture lists were matched in backward associative strength 
(BAS). Word lists (MBAS = 0.23, SD = 0.11) and picture lists (MBAS = 0.25, SD = 
0.09) did not differ in mean BAS, t(14) = 0.36, p = .72. For each stimulus type (word 
vs. picture), DRM lists were pseudo-randomly assigned to the self-reference (4 lists) 
and other-reference (4 lists) conditions and DRM lists were counterbalanced in a way 
that each list had an approximately equal chance of appearing in the self-reference or 
other-reference condition. For each material type, the recognition list included 8 
critical lures (one critical lure per list), 8 related but non-presented items (i.e., these 
items used to be members of the DRM lists thus they were weakly related to the DRM 
lists), 24 studied items, and 32 unrelated new items. The studied items were from the 
1st, 3rd and 7th position of each list. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment was a 2 (Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: word vs. 
picture) within-subject design. All participants went through a study-test round for 
verbal DRM lists and another study-test round for pictorial lists. Half of the 
participants studied word lists first and the other half studied the picture lists first. 
Each participant was tested individually in a quiet and isolated room. 
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Participants first filled in some information including their own name. They 
were instructed to enter the name that they were most frequently referred to. For each 
type of material, in the study phase, the DRM items were presented one by one 
together with either their own name (self-reference condition) or the name of a 
famous singer “Adele” (other-reference condition). Participants were asked to 
remember the items and whom the items appeared together with (self or Adele). The 
DRM words or pictures were shown list by list, and the items within a list always 
appeared with the same name (see Figure 2). For each type of materials, the study 
phase was separated in 4 blocks with each block containing two BAS matched lists (a 
self-referenced list and an other-referenced list).  
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the study phase for verbal stimuli (left) and pictorial stimuli (right). “Self” 
stands for participant’s own name. Words and pictures shown in the above figure are sample items 
from DRM lists, e.g., Door and Glass are words from the list with critical lure “Window”; Water and 
Stream are words from the “River” list. Each DRM list contained 8 items. Each pair was presented for 




After the study phase, participants performed a filler task (playing the 
“Bejeweled” game) for around 5 min. Then, in the test phase, they completed a 
recognition test and a separate memory association test. In the recognition test, words 
(or pictures) were shown at the center of the screen and participants responded by 
clicking the “Remember”, “Know”, or “New” button. If the item was new, they 
clicked the “New’ button; if they remembered the word (or picture) as old and can 
recall specific details such as size, color, shape, etc., they clicked the “Old: 
Remember” button; and if they identified the item as old but could not recall specific 
details, they clicked the “Old: Know” button (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; Yonelinas, 
2002). After all items were recognized, in a subsequent memory association test, 
participants were asked which source the words (or pictures) appeared together with 
by clicking on one of the four buttons: name of oneself, “Adele”, “Cannot remember”, 
or “Not presented”. Note that participants could choose “Not presented” if they 
thought the word (or picture) was not presented at all.   
 
Results 
Because we were most interested in examining the association data and the 
memory association test was independent from the recognition test, we first report the 
association data and then report the recognition results1. All data can be accessed at 
https://osf.io/k5sa8/. 
True Association 
A true association was defined as when participants correctly recalled the 
associated name when cued with a studied item. True association rate was calculated 
                                                
1 Note that the pre-registered data analyses plan included analyzing net accuracy data, but these data 
were not reported here because in retrospect they were not relevant to our main purpose. 
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as the proportion of the number of true associations out of all tested studied items. 
True association rates were corrected by subtracting relevant association rates of 
unrelated items to control for response bias. Consistent with previous findings 
(Cunningham et al., 2014; Durbin et al., 2017), a 2 (Reference: self vs. other) × 2 
(Stimuli: word vs. picture) repeated measures ANOVA on corrected true associations 
revealed a main effect of Reference, F(1,33) = 8.63, p = .006, partial η2= 0.21, 
indicating that more stimuli-self associations (M = 0.69, 95% CI [0.63, 0.75]) were 
remembered than stimuli-other associations (M = 0.59, 95% CI [0.53, 0.66]). We also 
found a main effect of Stimuli such that more associations were correctly remembered 
for picture stimuli (M = 0.77, 95% CI [0.72, 0.83]) than for word stimuli (M = 0.51, 
95% CI [0.44, 0.58]), F(1,33) = 68.06, p < .001, partial η2= 0.67. There was no 
statistically significant interaction effect between Reference and Stimuli, F(1,33) = 
3.06, p = .09, partial η2= 0.09. These findings confirm that self-reference can enhance 
true associations for both words and pictures. 
False Association 
Of particular interest was whether false associations to critical lures could be 
created. False association was defined as participants misremembering the lure 
word/picture paired with a name (i.e., their own name or the name Adele). For non-
presented unrelated words, participants recalled false associations for an average of 
7.44% (95%CI [0.03, 0.12]) of them, but participants constructed false associations 
for an average of 66.54% (95%CI [0.59, 0.74]) of all the critical lures in DRM word 
lists. In pictorial DRM lists, average false association rate for unrelated pictures was 
2.76% (95%CI [0.01, 0.04]), but participants developed false associations for 52.94% 
(95%CI [0.44, 0.61]) of all the critical lure pictures. Hence, although participants 
were given the chance to choose “Cannot remember” or “Not presented” for critical 
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lures during the memory association test, a large proportion of critical lure words and 
pictures were falsely remembered as having appeared together with their own name or 
Adele. 
False associations could be either critical lure-self associations (i.e., 
remembering critical lure paired with own name) or critical lure-other associations 
(i.e., remembering critical lure paired with Adele). Before making any further 
analysis, false association rates were corrected by subtracting the relevant false 
association rates for unrelated items to control for possible response bias. As Figure 3 
shows, a 2 (Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: word vs. picture) × 2 (False 
association type: critical lure-self vs. critical lure-other) repeated measures ANOVA 
on corrected false association rates showed a statistically significant interaction 
between Reference and False association type, F(1,33) = 207.16, p < .001, partial η2= 
0.86, suggesting that the reference condition impacted the false association types. No 
other interaction effects or main effects were found. 
 
 
Figure 3. Corrected false association rates in self-reference and other-reference conditions (Experiment 
1). Left (A): DRM word lists; right (B): DRM picture lists. Error bars denote 95%CIs. 
 
A. DRM word lists B. DRM picture lists 
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To further illustrate the Reference × False association interaction, follow-up 
ANOVA analyses broken down by Reference were conducted. As Figure 3 shows, in 
self-referenced DRM lists, critical lures were more likely to be misremembered as 
having appeared together with one’s own name than with the name “Adele”, F(1,33) 
= 166.22, p < .001, partial η2= 0.36. However, in the other-reference condition, i.e., 
when DRM lists were paired with “Adele”, critical lures were more likely to be 
misremembered as having appeared together with the name “Adele” rather than with 
their own name, F(1,33) = 103.42, p < .001, partial η2= 0.47. These results showed 
that critical lures were most frequently mis-associated with the referential name of 
their related DRM lists, what we term here as “congruent false associations”. 
Our second interest was to explore whether self-referencing would enhance the 
formation of congruent false associations relative to other-referencing. To this end, 
we compared the magnitude of the effects in the above analyses to contrast the 
binding effect of self vs. other. The magnitude of the binding effect was calculated as 
the net proportion of congruent false associations, e.g., subtracting the proportion of 
critical lure-other associations from proportion of critical lure-self associations in the 
self-reference condition. We did exploratory comparisons on the binding effect in 
word and picture stimuli. We found that, for word stimuli, the net proportion of 
congruent false associations was significantly higher in the self-reference condition 
(M = 0.51, 95%CI [0.41, 0.62]) than in the other-reference condition (M = 0.36, 
95%CI [0.25, 0.46]),  t(33) = 2.21, p = 0.03, Cohen’s d = 0.54, suggesting the stronger 
binding effect of the self in forming congruent false associations. These results 
suggest that the self not only generates more congruent false associations, but also 
“clusters” the lure words attached to the self. For pictures, the net proportion of 
congruent false associations in the self-reference condition (M = 0.43, 95%CI [0.31, 
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0.55]) was similar to that in the other-reference condition (M = 0.41, 95%CI [0.29, 
0.52]), t(33) = 0.29, p = 0.78, Cohen’s d = 0.05.  
 
Table 1. Response rates for critical lures in different reference and stimuli conditions 
during memory association test (Experiment 1; Means with 95%CIs). 
Stimuli type 
& Reference  
Response Rates 
Critical lure-Self Critical lure-Adele Cannot Remember Not Presented* 
Word lists     
Self-reference 0.59 [0.51, 0.67] 0.07 [0.02, 0.12] 0.12 [0.05, 0.19] 0.22 [0.15, 0.29] 
Other-reference 0.15 [0.08, 0.21] 0.52 [0.44, 0.61] 0.12 [0.05, 0.20] 0.21 [0.13, 0.28] 
Picture lists     
Self-reference 0.47 [0.37, 0.58] 0.04 [0.00, 0.07] 0.10 [0.05, 0.15] 0.39 [0.29, 0.49] 
Other-reference 0.07 [0.02, 0.12] 0.48 [0.38, 0.57] 0.08 [0.03, 0.13] 0.37 [0.26, 0.37] 





 Based on the R/K paradigm, participants responded either “Remember” or 
“Know” when they judged an item as presented during the recognition test. A 2 
(Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: word vs. picture) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted separately for proportions of remember responses and know responses 
to studied items. As Table 2 illustrates, for remember responses of studied items, we 
found a main effect of Reference, F(1,33) = 15.85, p < .001, partial η2= 0.33; that is, 
the self-reference condition had statistically more remember responses to studied 
items than the other-reference condition. We also found a main effect of Stimuli, 
where pictorial lists had statistically higher remember rates than word lists, F(1,33) = 
22.99, p < .001, partial η2= 0.41. There was no statistically significant interaction 
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effect, F(1,33) = 0.06, p = .80. For know response rates, there were neither main 
effects nor interaction effect of Reference and Stimuli. 
 
Table 2. Remember and Know rates of studied items, critical lures and unrelated 
items in different reference and stimuli conditions (Experiment 1; Means with 
95%CIs). 
Item type & 
Reference  
DRM word lists DRM picture lists 
Remember Know Remember Know 
Studied items     
Self-reference 0.55 [0.45, 0.65] 0.25 [0.16, 0.34] 0.76 [0.68, 0.84] 0.16 [0.09, 0.22] 
Other-reference 0.45 [0.36, 0.54] 0.26 [0.18, 0.33] 0.68 [0.59, 0.76] 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] 
Critical lures     
Self-reference 0.46 [0.34, 0.57] 0.24 [0.14, 0.33] 0.22 [0.13, 0.31] 0.29 [0.19, 0.38] 
Other-reference 0.34 [0.24, 0.46] 0.35 [0.24, 0.46] 0.22 [0.14, 0.31] 0.24 [0.16, 0.33] 




False recognition happened when participants responded “remember” or 
“know” to a non-presented critical lure. A 2 (Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: 
word vs. picture) × 2 (Recognition: remember vs. know) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted on false recognition rates of critical lures (see data on “critical lures” 
in Table 2). A statistically significant three-way interaction was found, F(1,33) = 
4.36, p = .045, partial η2= 0.12. As Table 2 shows, for proportion of remember 
responses, self-reference increased false remembering recognitions of critical lures 
significantly compared to other-reference, t(33) = 2.08, p = 0.045, Cohen’s d = 0.36, 
which aligns well with previous research (Wang et al., 2019), but it did not increase 
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remember recognitions for pictorial critical lures, t(33) ≈ 0.00, p ≈ 1.00. For 
proportions of know responses, self-reference did not have any impact on knowing 
rates to critical lures in either word or picture DRM lists. Table 2 includes specific 
remember and know rates in all conditions. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 has replicated a number of findings from previous studies. First, 
we replicated the classical self-reference effect (Symons & Johnson, 1997; Wang et 
al., 2019). That is, self-reference increased remembering or recollection of studied 
items for both word and picture stimuli. Second, we replicated the finding that the self 
can enhance (true) stimuli-self associations for both word and picture stimuli (e.g., 
Cunningham et al., 2014). Third, we also replicated our previous results concerning 
the self-reference false memory effect that self-reference facilitates the false 
recollection of critical lures (Wang et al., 2019).  
The novel findings are that when DRM word and picture lists were paired with 
one’s own name or other’s name, participants not only falsely remembered that 
critical lure words and pictures had been presented, but also falsely associated the lure 
words and pictures with their own name or the other name. This suggests that, without 
an actual learning experience, the memory system can spontaneously construct a false 
association for elements from different episodic memories, thus creating a new 
memory such as one’s own name paired with a non-presented lure word/picture. 
Moreover, such constructive processes seem to be driven by semantic associations. 
When DRM lists were paired with the self, their semantically related lures were 
mostly associated with the self; and when DRM lists were paired with another 
person’s name, corresponding lures were mostly associated with that name. 
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Critically, results from Experiment 1 also suggest that the self specifically 
facilitates the creation of congruent false associations, i.e., without increasing the 
overall rates of false associations. We found that, although both self- and other- 
referencing led to false associations formed between critical lures and the referenced 
person, the self-binding effect was larger than the other-binding effect, particularly in 
the word lists. That is, the net proportion of critical lure-self associations was 
significantly higher than the net proportion of critical lure-other associations. These 
results suggest that the self might enhance the binding of elements from different 
episodic memories (e.g., one’s own name with a critical lure).  
Regarding the effect of stimulus, the differences between self-reference and 
other-reference on false association rates were found only for word, not for picture, 
stimuli. Picture DRM lists have a higher level of distinctive information than verbal 
DRM lists and item-specific processing is more likely be engaged in pictorial than 
verbal stimuli. Such discrepancies support the hypothesis that item-specific 
processing might play a role in the self-reference effect on false memory. If self-
referencing is not mediated by item-specific processing, there should be no statistical 
difference on the effect of self-referencing between verbal and pictorial DRM lists. 
However, we did not observe the impact of stimulus on the false association results. 
That is, when we compared false association rates in the word and picture lists, no 
statistically significant difference was found. Although our analyses on net 
proportions of congruent false associations found a self-binding effect in words and 
not in pictures, these analyses were merely exploratory and cannot convincingly lead 
to a conclusive stimulus distinction on false association. To further investigate 
whether stimulus can impact the formation of false associations, Experiment 2 was 
conducted. In Experiment 1, the word DRM lists and the picture DRM lists were 
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different lists (because we were using a within-subjects design); and different lists 
might have different probabilities to induce false recognitions or false associations. To 
rule out this possibility, in Experiment 2, we used the same DRM lists for the word 
condition and the picture condition, which required a between-subjects design. That 
is, the word lists were matched with the picture lists such that each picture list was the 
pictorial form of a word list (see Wang et al., 2018). Another limitation of Experiment 
1 was that each reference condition had only four lists, so four critical lures in total, 
which might reduce the power. Thus, in Experiment 2, we increased the number of 
DRM lists in each condition, matched the DRM word lists and picture lists, and used 





A total of 68 participants were tested in Experiment 2 based on the sample size 
of Experiment 1. Half of the participants (N = 34) were randomly assigned to the 
word group (9 males and 25 females, Mage= 22.44, SD= 2.96) and the other half (N = 
34) to the picture group (9 males and 25 females, Mage= 23, SD= 2.90). Participants 
were recruited from the online participant pool at Maastricht University and they 
received course credits for their participation in the experiment.  
Materials 
Ten word DRM lists (eight items per list) and their corresponding pictorial 
versions were used in Experiment 2. For example, a DRM word list that contained 
words such as truck, bus, train and Jeep, had a corresponding pictorial DRM list 
containing images of truck, bus, train and Jeep. The word group studied 10 verbal 
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DRM lists and the picture group studied 10 pictorial DRM lists with the exact same 
concepts. In this case, the lists were strictly matched in the two groups. The DRM 
word and picture lists were used in a previous study (Wang et al., 2018). Half of the 
lists for each group were assigned to the self-reference condition and the other half 
were assigned to the other-reference condition. Lists in the self-reference and other-
reference conditions were counterbalanced in a way that each list has equal chance to 
be assigned to one of the reference conditions. 
The recognition list for each type of stimulus contained 10 critical lures (one 
per list), 30 studied items (three items per list), 30 new unrelated items and 10 new 
related items. The studied items were from the 1st, 3rd, and 7th position of each list. 
Thus, the word group received a verbal version of the recognition list and the picture 
group were tested with a pictorial version of the same recognition items. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment used a 2 (Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: word vs. 
picture) mixed design, with Reference as a within-subject variable and Stimuli as a 
between-subjects variable. The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical as in 




In line with Experiment 1, a 2 (Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: word 
vs. picture) repeated measures ANOVA on corrected true association rates showed a 
main effect of Reference, F(1,66) = 29.23, p < .001, partial η2= 0.31, with more 
stimuli-self associations being remembered (M = 0.61, 95% CI [0.55, 0.66]) than 
stimuli-other associations (M = 0.47, 95% CI [0.42, 0.52]). We also found a main 
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effect of Stimuli such that more correct associations were remembered for picture 
stimuli (M = 0.64, 95% CI [0.57, 0.70]) than for word stimuli (M = 0.44, 95% CI 
[0.37, 0.50]), F(1,66) = 18.25, p < .001, partial η2= 0.22. No statistically significant 
interaction effect was found between Reference and Stimuli, F(1,66) = 0.95, p = .33, 
partial η2= 0.01.  
 
 
Figure 4. Corrected false association rates in self-reference and other-reference conditions (Experiment 
2). Left (A): word group, n = 34; right (B): picture group, n = 34. Error bars denote 95%CIs. 
False Association 
As Figure 4 illustrates, a 2 (Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: word vs. 
picture) × 2 (False association type: critical lure-self vs. critical lure-other) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on corrected false association rates. A main effect 
of False association type was found, F(1,66) = 9.44, p = .003, partial η2 = 0.13, 
showing that there were more critical lure-self associations than critical lure-other 
associations in general. Similar to Experiment 1, a significant interaction effect 
between Reference and False association type was found, F(1,66) = 138.96, p < .001, 
partial η2 = 0.68, suggesting false association types were impacted by the reference 
conditions. There was a significant interaction effect between Reference and Stimuli, 
F(1,66) = 8.20, p = .006, partial η2= 0.11, as well as a significant interaction between 
B. Picture group A. Word group 
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False association type and Stimuli, F(1,66) = 4.79, p = .03, partial η2= 0.07. 
Interaction effects were broken down as described below.  
Post-hoc analysis examining the Reference × False association interaction 
showed that, for both lure words and lure pictures of self-reference lists, they were 
mostly falsely associated with the self rather than with Adele, F(1,66) = 118.72, p 
< .001: for word stimuli, t(33) = 7.39, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.92; for picture stimuli, 
t(33) = 8.51, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.20. Equivalently, for lure words and lure 
pictures of other-reference lists, they were more likely to be falsely associated with 
Adele, F(1,66) = 38.85, p < .001: for word stimuli, t(33) = -2.82, p = 0.008, Cohen’s d 
= -0.75; for picture stimuli, t(33) = -6.69, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = -1.80. 
Since we found an interaction effect between False association type and 
Stimuli, separate analyses broken down by Stimuli (i.e., simple main effect analyses) 
were conducted. For word stimuli, there were statistically more false associations 
related to the self than false associations related to the other, F(1,66) = 9.25, p = .005, 
partial η2= 0.05; however, for picture stimuli, no statistical difference was found 
between self-related and other-related false associations, F(1,66) = 0.77, p = .39. This 
suggests that the self-enhanced binding effect for false associations was only observed 
in word stimuli. Moreover, to further investigate the Reference × Stimuli interaction, 
separate ANOVA analyses were broken down again by Stimuli. Self-referencing did 
not statistically increase the overall false association rates compared to other-
referencing in word stimuli, F(1,66) = 2.56, p = .12, while in picture stimuli, other-
referencing even had higher false association rates relative to self-referencing, F(1,66) 
= 6.60, p = .02, partial η2= 0.02. 
To examine if self-reference facilitates the construction of congruent false 
associations, we conducted the following tests on false association scores as in 
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Experiment 1. We contrasted the magnitude of the binding effect of self vs. other. A 2 
(Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: word vs. picture) repeated measures ANOVA 
on the net proportion of congruent false associations was conducted. We found no 
significant main effect of Stimuli, F(1,66) = 0.09, p = .76, partial η2= 0.001, but a 
significant main effect of Reference, F(1,66) = 7.74, p = .007, partial η2= 0.11, 
showing more congruent false associations in the self-reference than other-reference 
condition. We also observed a statistically significant interaction effect, F(1,66) = 
7.14, p = .01, partial η2= 0.10. Similar to what we found in Experiment 1, in the word 
group (see Figure 4), net critical lure-self association proportion in the self-reference 
condition (M = 0.48, 95% CI [0.35, 0.60]) was significantly higher than the net 
critical lure-other association proportion in the other reference condition (M = 0.19, 
95% CI [0.06, 0.32]), t(33) = 3.33, p = 0.002, Cohen’s d = 0.80, indicating a stronger 
binding effect of the self in binding critical lures with itself. For picture stimuli, net 
critical lure-self association proportions did not differ in the self-reference (M = 0.35, 
95% CI [0.26, 0.44]) and other-reference (M = 0.35, 95% CI [0.24, 0.45]) conditions, 
t(33) = 0.10, p = 0.92. 
 
Table 3. Response rates for critical lures in different reference and stimuli conditions 
during memory association test (Experiment 2; Means with 95%CIs). 
Stimuli type 
& Reference  
Response Rates 
Critical lure-Self Critical lure-Adele Cannot Remember Not Presented* 
Word group     
Self-reference 0.55 [0.44, 0.66] 0.07 [0.03, 0.11] 0.12 [0.05, 0.20] 0.26 [0.18, 0.33] 
Other-reference 0.18 [0.10, 0.25] 0.36 [0.27, 0.46] 0.12 [0.05, 0.19] 0.33 [0.24, 0.42] 
Picture group     
Self-reference 0.43 [0.35, 0.51] 0.08 [0.04, 0.11] 0.35 [0.27, 0.43] 0.14 [0.08, 0.20] 
Other-reference 0.13 [0.08, 0.18] 0.48 [0.40, 0.56] 0.29 [0.21, 0.38] 0.10 [0.05, 0.15] 






Remember and Know rates of various items were reported in Table 4. We 
conducted a 2 (Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: word vs. picture) repeated 
measures ANOVA on remember and know rates of studied items respectively. For 
remember rates, there was a main effect of Reference, F(1,66) = 8.75, p = .004, partial 
η2= 0.12; that is, the self-reference condition had statistically more remember 
responses to studied items than the other-reference condition. We also found a main 
effect of Stimuli, with the picture group having significantly higher remember rates 
than the word group, F(1,66) = 19.58, p < .001, partial η2= 0.23. No statistically 
significant interaction effect was detected, F(66) = 0.14, p = .71. For the know 
response rates, only a main effect of Stimuli was found, F(1,66) = 9.88, p = .003, 
partial η2= 0.13, where the word group had higher know rates than the picture group. 
False Recognition 
Previous research (Wang et al., 2019) as well as results in Experiment 1 
showed that self-referencing mainly impacts false remembering. 2 (Reference: self vs. 
other) × 2 (Stimuli: word vs. picture) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on 
remember rates as well as know rates of critical lures (see Table 4). For remember 
rates, there was neither a main effect of Reference, F(1,66) = 1.19, p = .28, nor a main 
effect of Stimuli, F(1,66) = 0.003, p = .95. When analyzing know rates of critical 
lures, we found no main effect of Reference, F(1,66) = 0.19, p = .67, no main effect 
of Stimuli, F(1,66) = 1.59, p = .21, and no significant interaction effect, F(1,66) = 
0.008, p = .93. Table 4 shows remember and know rates of critical lures in each 





Table 4. Remember and Know rates of studied items, critical lures and unrelated items in 
different reference and stimuli conditions (Experiment 2; Means with 95%CIs). 
Item type & 
Reference  
DRM word lists DRM picture lists 
Remember Know Remember Know 
Studied items     
Self-reference 0.48 [0.38, 0.58] 0.33 [0.24, 0.42] 0.69 [0.62, 0.76] 0.17 [0.12, 0.22] 
Other-reference 0.39 [0.30, 0.48] 0.33 [0.24, 0.42] 0.62 [0.57, 0.68] 0.21 [0.16, 0.26] 
Critical lures     
Self-reference 0.28 [0.19, 0.28] 0.34 [0.26, 0.42] 0.25 [0.18, 0.32] 0.28 [0.19, 0.36] 
Other-reference 0.22 [0.14, 0.31] 0.32 [0.24, 0.41] 0.26 [0.20, 0.32] 0.26 [0.17, 0.36] 
Unrelated items 0.10 [0.05, 0.14] 0.04 [0.02, 0.06] 0.03 [0.006, 0.05] 0.01 [0.001, 0.02] 
 
However, when we combined remember and know responses and examined 
the overall recognition rates (i.e., summing up the remember and know rates), a 2 
(Reference: self vs. other) × 2 (Stimuli: word vs. picture) × 2 (Recognition: true vs. 
false) repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Reference, 
F(1,66) = 6.44, p = .01, partial η2= 0.09, with generally higher recognition rates in the 
self-reference than the other-reference condition. There was also a main effect of 
Recognition, F(1,66) = 82.91, p < .001, partial η2= 0.56, with more true recognitions 
than false recognitions on average. The only significant interaction effect was 
between Reference and Stimuli, F(1,66) = 6.25, p = .01, partial η2= 0.09. Recognition 
(true/false) neither interacted with Reference nor with Stimuli. Follow-up analyses 
(with Bonferroni correction) revealed that, for both true and false recognitions, self-
reference led to higher recognition rates in word stimuli (p = .005) but not in picture 
stimuli (p = .51). Thus, Experiment 2 found the self-reference false memory effect for 






Experiment 2 has replicated the main findings of Experiment 1. Specifically, 
(1) false associations of critical lures can be robustly constructed for both word and 
picture stimuli. That is, 36% - 55% of the critical words were falsely associated with a 
reference name and 43% - 48% of the critical pictures were falsely associated with a 
reference name (see Table 3); (2) there were more critical lure-self associations 
formed than critical lure-other associations. With more DRM lists included per 
reference condition, the enhancing effect of the self on association construction has 
been robustly demonstrated. 
Another interesting finding was a discrepancy on false recognition/association 
results for different stimuli. Consistent with results in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 
found that self-reference only facilitated (overall) false recognition and false 
association formation for words but not for pictures, even with DRM word lists and 
DRM picture lists being the same lists. The picture lists and words lists share the same 
concepts and the same critical lures, hence a main difference between these two 
stimulus types should be the level of item-specific information (Schacter et al., 1999). 
When looking at the overall false recognition and false association rates of critical 
pictures in the self-reference and other-reference conditions respectively, we found 
that false memory rates of critical pictures did not differ in the self-reference and 
other-reference conditions, suggesting that item-specific processing impacts the self-
reference false memory effect. 
 
General Discussion 
The current experiments examined whether false associations can be 
spontaneously created in episodic memory and how the self plays a role in forming 
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false associations. For the first question, our two experiments consistently showed 
that false associations can be constructed even for non-presented words and pictures 
at a robust level (on average, 52% ~ 66%). When a list of related items (e.g., truck, 
bus, train, keys, garage, etc.) was paired with oneself or another person, participants 
later misremembered that a related but non-presented item (i.e., car) was also paired 
with themselves or the other person. Furthermore, these false associations seem to be 
directional in the sense that they may be guided by the semantic connectivity in the 
memory network. That is, we found that non-presented critical lures were most 
frequently associated with the referential person of their semantically related DRM 
lists (see Figure 1), even though participants could choose that they “Cannot 
Remember” the association or the critical lure was simply “Not Presented”.  
This is the first study to construct false associations between non-experienced 
stimuli and the self in episodic memory. Memory researchers have long speculated 
about the reconstructive nature of memory. For example, Bartlett (1932) first 
suggested that memory is reconstructive, i.e., that people can fill in missing elements 
while remembering, leading to false memories of the missing elements. Since then 
researchers have successfully induced false memories with different experimental 
paradigms (e.g., Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), confirming 
the reconstructive nature of memory. However, little is known about how exactly 
memory is constructed. By focusing on associations between stimuli, the current 
experiments showed that our memory system can construct new associations (e.g., 
critical lure-self or critical lure-other) based on semantic relatedness.  
Spreading Activation and Constructive False Memory 
The constructive memory phenomenon in the current experiments can be 
readily explained by spreading activation accounts (Anderson, 1983; Howe et al., 
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2009; Roediger et al., 2001). In a memory network, concepts from DRM lists such as 
butter, flour, dough, sandwich, jam and milk are embedded and there are existing 
associations relating each concept to the critical lure bread due to, for example, 
personal experiences. When these DRM items (words or pictures) are incidentally 
paired with one’s own name (or another person’s name), stimuli concepts as well as 
the reference person are activated and therefore stimuli-self (or stimuli-other) 
associations can be formed in the memory network (see Figure 1). According to the 
spreading-activation principle, activations of the list items can spread automatically to 
their related concepts (e.g., bread), resulting in the activation of bread as well. 
Indeed, recent neuroimaging research has shown that critical lure concepts are 
probably activated during encoding (Zhu et al., 2019). Thus, critical lures and the self 
(or “Adele”) are activated together and this co-activation could possibly lead to a false 
association being constructed between critical lures and the self (or other) in the 
memory network. Intriguingly, we indeed found that high levels of false associations 
were constructed spontaneously in participants’ memory, which is consistent with the 
automaticity assumption of spreading activation.  
What the current experiments cannot tell us is whether the false associations 
were created during encoding or retrieval. Since previous research showed that false 
memories of critical lures are probably formed during encoding (e.g., Gallo, Roediger, 
& McDermott, 2001; Zhu et al., 2019), in the current study, false associations 
between critical lures and the reference person could have been formed during 
encoding, too. However, that does not have to be the case, and the false associations 
could also have been formed at retrieval. Roediger et al. (2004) proposed that 
attribution of the critical lures might be the function of participants’ knowledge about 
the structure of the memory test. Similarly, participants in the current study might 
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reason that if they recollected that a word or picture was presented, it should have 
appeared together with either their own name or the other person’s name. However, if 
false associations are constructed during retrieval, it is intriguing that participants 
made false associations even though they could have opted for not remembering the 
source or saying that the critical lure was not presented. Future research is needed to 
investigate at which phase false associations are formed. 
Self-enhanced Constructive Effect and its Boundary 
For our second question, whether the self plays a role in false association 
construction, the answer is yes. We looked at two indicators related to this question: 
the absolute number of congruent false associations created in the self-reference and 
other reference conditions, and the net proportion of congruent false associations 
within each reference condition. In both experiments, we found that (1) there were 
more critical lure-self associations constructed than critical lure-other associations and 
(2) in the self-reference condition, the net proportion of critical lure-self associations 
was significantly higher than the net proportion of critical lure-other associations in 
the other-reference condition. Although these results were only found with word 
stimuli, they suggest that when people process information related to themselves, they 
tend to construct more associations of non-experienced stimuli related to themselves, 
and this self-enhanced constructive effect may only work at the verbal or low item-
specific level. 
We term the phenomenon of enhancing both false recognition and false 
association by the self as the self-enhanced constructive effect. The reason for 
observing such an effect may be due to the relational processing of the self as well as 
spreading activation in the memory network. For true associations, Experiments 1 and 
2 have replicated the previous finding that self-reference enhances learned stimuli-self 
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associations; that is, the binding of stimuli to oneself for both words and pictures 
(Cunningham et al., 2014; Durbin, Mitchell, & Johnson, 2017). As Sui and Humphry 
(2015) proposed, the self can facilitate the binding of memory to source. When the 
self was paired with DRM items in our experiments, we indeed found that more 
stimuli-self associations were remembered. When more stimuli-self associations were 
encoded in memory, according to the spreading-activation account, more activation 
might spread to the critical lure and more indirect associations might be established 
between the self and the critical lure (see Figure 1), resulting in a higher chance of 
creating critical lure-self associations. 
However, we found in our study that the self-enhanced constructive effect is 
limited to verbal stimuli and does not extend to picture stimuli. This difference might 
be accounted for by the amount of item-specific information in the stimuli. The main 
mechanisms underlying the self-reference effect have been suggested to be item-
specific processing and relational processing (Klein, 2012; Symons & Johnson, 1997), 
for which the main evidence came from the experiment by Klein and Loftus (1988). 
Our results have extended the dual-processing account to self-referencing on false 
memory. For true recognition/association, both experiments found that self-reference 
simultaneously increased true recollection as well as stimuli-self relational binding for 
both words and pictures. This is because self-referencing can evoke both item-specific 
processing (i.e., recollection) and relational processing (i.e., association), and both of 
them benefit true memory (see Huff & Bodner, 2019), regardless of stimulus types. 
For false recognition/association, both experiments found that self-reference increased 
false recognition and false association in the word but not picture condition. The 
reason why we did not find a self-enhanced constructive effect in pictures might be 
due to the opposing effects of this dual processing on false memory: item-specific 
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processing usually suppresses false memory (McCabe, Presmanes, Robertson, Smith, 
2004) while relational processing can enhance false memory (Gallo & Roediger, 
2002). In the picture condition where item-specific processing is naturally boosted, 
the opposing effects of self-referencing might have cancelled out in picture stimuli, 
resulting in a null effect. By contrast, words generally have low distinctive item-
specific information, so the effect of relational processing might surpass the effect of 
item-specific processing, resulting in a larger false memory effect.  
One might argue that what we found may be specifically due to an “Adele” 
effect as “Adele” was used in both experiments. However, previous research on the 
self-reference effect suggests that this is unlikely. First, many studies have used 
celebrity names (e.g., presidents, singers, actors) in the other-reference condition and 
found similar results when studying the effect of self vs. other on true memory (see a 
review by Symons & Johnson, 1997). Second, our previous research on self-reference 
and false memory used other names such as “Trump” and “Li Ming” in different 
cultural groups but found no difference between these names (Wang et al., 2019). 
Indeed, false recognition data from the current two experiments have replicated the 
same result pattern as in Wang et al. (2019). Thus, it is unlikely that the enhanced 
effect of self on false memory was particularly due to the name “Adele”. The reason 
for using “Adele” as the other-reference name in both experiments is because we 
wanted to make the results comparable across the two experiments.  
Taken together, we found that false associations of non-presented words and 
pictures can be constructed in episodic memory. More importantly, we found a self-
enhanced constructive effect that self-reference enhances the formation of congruent 
false associations in verbal stimuli. We propose that spreading activation in the 
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memory network leads to false association construction, and item-specific processing 
might inhibit the self-enhanced constructive effect. 
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